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CIVIL PROCEDURE-SERVICE OF PROCESS UNDER NONRESIDENT MOTORIST
STATUTE-EFFECT OF DEATH OF NoNRESIDENT DEFENDANT-A wife sued for
the wrongful death of her husband, which was allegedly caused by a nonresident defendant's negligent operation of his automobile on a Wisconsin
highway while the plaintiff's husband was a passenger therein. Service of
process was made on the Commissioner of the Motor Vehicle Department in
Wisconsin, and copies of the summons and complaint were mailed to defendant
in Illinois in accordance with the Wisconsin nonresident motorist statute.1
Shortly thereafter, before a judgment was rendered, defendant died. Plaintiff
sought to revive the action against defendant's administrator by serving notice
of the filing of a petition for revival on the Commissioner of the Motor Vehicle
Department in Wisconsin and by serving upon the nonresident administrator
by registered mail a copy of the petition. On special appearance by the
administrator the circuit court ordered the petition for revival and the notice
set aside and vacated. On appeal, held, reversed. By virtue of the nonresident
motorist statute a user of the highway makes an irrevocable appointment of a
state official as his agent for the purpose of receiving process. The appointment
is binding on the nonresident's administrator, and an action pending against
the decedent at the time of his death may be revived against the administrator.
Tarczynski v. Chicago, Milwaukee;. St. Paul & Pacipc R. R., 261 Wis. 149, 52
N. W. (2d) 396 (1952).
Encouraged by Kane v. New Jersey2 and Hess v. Pawloski,3 all forty-eight
states and the District of Columbia now have nonresident motorist statutes by
which a state through substituted service may obtain jurisdiction over persons
who commit liability-creating acts while driving upon the highways of the
forum state.4 In their initial form, however, the statutes made no specific
provision for obtaining jurisdiction over the personal representative5 of the
motorist, so that if the wrongdoer died prior to or pending suit, substituted
service was not available. 6 Several legislatures have amended their statutes to
120 Colo. 454, 210 P. (2d) 985 (1949). As to the possibility of splitting a cause of action
in re a declaratory judgment proceeding compare New Haven Water Co. v. New Haven,
131 Conn. 456, 40 A. (2d) 763 (1944), and Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. City of
Bellevue, 284 Ky. 405, 144 S.W. (2d) 1046 (1940).
Wis. Stat. (1951) §85.05(3).
242 U.S. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30 (1916), upholding a New Jersey statute which provided
that a nonresident could not use the state's highways unless he first executed a written
instrument designating the secretary of state as attorney for the service of process.
3 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927). The statute involved did not require the motorist's actual consent for the appointment.
4 For a compilation of all the nonresident motorist statutes as of 1947, see Knoop v.
Anderson, (D.C. Iowa 1947) 71 F. Supp. 832.
5 In this note "personal representative" is used to include executor and administrator,
unless othenvise indicated.
6 Courts uniformly held that in absence of a specific provision the personal representative of a deceased motorist was not reached by substituted service. Usually this result was
by construction of the statute. Downing v. Schwenck, 138 Neb. 395, 293 N.W. 278
(1940); Donnelly v. Carpenter, 55 Ohio App. 463, 9 N.E. (2d) 888 (1936); Ledin v.
Davison, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N.W. 718 (1934). Some relied in part upon revocation of
1

2
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provide that a motorist's appointment of a public official as his agent for
purposes of service is to be binding on the motorist's personal representative in
any proceeding against the motorist or the personal representative growing out
of the former's use of the highway. 7 Since any judgment recovered in the forum
will have to be enforced,. if at all, in the state of the decedent's domicile, the
validity of these amendments will probably be raised by the issue of constitutional full faith and credit, which involves the question of the forum's
jurisdiction. Thus far the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on the
matter. Four other courts, however, had considered the problem prior to the
principal case. 8 Two arguments against the validity of these amended statutes
have generally been advanced: (I) Since the statutes are framed in terms of
agency between the nonresident motorist and the public officer, the agency is
terminated by the death of the motorist; and (2) although jurisdiction can be
acquired over the motorist himself in an in personam action under Hess 11.
Pawloski, an action against the personal representative is an action in rem, and
since the decedent's property is outside the forum, no jurisdiction is acquired over
the res by substituted service on the personal representative. The usual answer
to the first argument has been that the appointment of the agent is an act of
the forum's police power, and the police power is not limited by common law
rules of agency and contract.9 That the agency is not revoked by death would
seem to be clear, inasmuch as Hess 11. Pawloski is grounded upon the idea that
the appointment is in truth made by the state, not by the motorist. 1 Furthermore, the real basis of jurisdiction over the motorist is not the agency of the
public officer, but rather the doing of a liability-creating act by the motorist
and the giving of notice to him. 11 Furthermore, as long as it is constitutional
for the state to make the appointment while the motorist lives, no reason is
perceived why the appointment may not in accordance with due process be
made to continue after the death of the motorist. But whether the statute
ought to be permitted to confer jurisdiction over the personal representative is

°

the agency of the public officer by death of The motorist. Young v. Potter Title & Trust
Co., 114 N.J.L. 561, 178 A. 177 (1935); Donnelly v. Carpenter, supra this note.
7 Note l supra.
8 The cases holding

that these provisions give the forum jurisdiction over the personal
representative are Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. (2d) 876 (1950); Plopa v.
Du Pre, 327 Mich. 660, 42 N.W. (2d) 777 (1950); and Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark.
792, 171 S.W. (2d) 287 (1943). Contra: Knoop v. Anderson, note 4 supra. Although the
principal case is the first to raise the issue on revivor, it would seem to be subject to the
same analysis as cases based on an action brought against the personal representative in
the first instance. McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148 N.E. 556 (1925); Heath v.
Santa Lucia Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 3 F. (2d) 326; Giampalo v. Taylor, 335 Pa. 121, 6 A.
(2d) 499 (1939).
9 Plopa v. Du Pre, note 8 supra, Oviatt v. Garretson, note 8 supra, Leighton v. Roper,
note 8 supra, stated that the agency was created for the benefit of third persons and the
state, and so was not revoked by death.
10 This appears to be the primary distinction between the statute involved in Kane v.
New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30 (1916), and the one involved in Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927). See notes 2 and 3 supra.
11 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259 (1928).
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another question. As to the second argument, it would seem that no valid
ground has been advanced for considering this action an in rem proceeding.
No right to possession or title to specific property is being asserted or adjudicated.
Only a judgment that can be asserted against the decedent's personal representative in a subsequent probate proceeding is being sought. 12 In any event
it is clear that the personal representative must be before the court in his
official capacity in order to have a judgment that is enforceable in the state of
domicile. The issue, then, is whether such jurisdiction can be obtained by
substituted service.13
Traditionally it has been the rule that a personal representative cannot be
sued in a state other than the one appointing him,14 even though he makes a
general appearance,1 5 nor can an action pending at the decedent's death be
revived against the personal representative.16 It is said· that this is so because
in the contemplation of the law the personal representative exists in his official
capacity only because of the act of appointment by the state of the decedent's
domicile.17 Since the appointing state has given him all his powers and has
not consented to his being recognized elsewhere, he cannot cross the boundary
of that state in his official capacity.18 Thus, the forum in reaching out to grasp
the personal representative cannot lay hold upon him in his official capacity,19
which is necessary for reaching the estate, the real purpose of the action.
Furthermore, it is said that the personal representative by accepting his office
has agreed to be subject only to the laws of the place that has control of the
decedent's estate. For an outside sovereign to impinge upon his duties would
be to require him to pay the debts of another man against his will.20 A state's
12Leighton v. Roper, note 8 supra. See also Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 66
S.Ct. 296 (1946). This fact is sometimes used to support the argument that no interference
with the administration of estates would result from permitting the forum to acquire jurisdiction. 61 HARV, L. REv. 355 (1948); Scott, "Hess and Pawloski Carry On," 64 HARv.
L. REv. 98 (1950).
13 The argument favoring the obtention of jurisdiction is necessarily dependent upon
the police power for several reasons: Hess v. Pawloski appears to rest upon the forum's
police power; any fiction that consent of the decedent binds the personal representative is
exploded by Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 210 U.S. 82, 28 S.Ct. 702 (1908); and consent
of the personal representative would not be sufficient, note 15 infra.
141 WoERNER, AMERICAN I.Aw oF .ADMJ:NISTRATION §160 (1923); CoNFLICT OF
LAws RESTATEMENT §512 (1934); citations in 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., 1552,
n. 3 (1935).
15 CONFLICT oF LAws RESTATEMENT §513 (1935); Jefferson v. Beall, 117 Ala. 436,
22 S. 44 (1897); First Nat. Bank v. Pancake, 172 N.C. 513, 90 S.E. 515 (1916). Contra:
Evans v. Tatem, 9 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 252 (1823).
16 McMaster v. Gould, note 8 supra; Nat. Bank of Topeka v. Mitchell, 154 Kan. 276,
118 P. (2d) 519 (1941).
17 CONFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT §512, comment a (1948 Supp.); Goodrich,
"Conllict of Laws Since the Restatement," 23 A.B.A.J. 119 (1937); 21 CoRN. L.Q. 458
(1936).
18 In re Cowham's Estate, 220 Mich. 560, 190 N.W. 680 (1922); Nash v. Benari,
117 Me. 491, 105 A. 107 (1918).
19 Nor would he be reached in his personal capacity, inasmuch as he has no basic
relationship with the forum upon which to base jurisdiction.
20 3 BEALE, CONFLICT oF LAws, 3d ed., 1553 (1935).
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police power seems unable to exist to this extent without overturning many
established rules of the administration of estates and diminishing any concept
of the sovereignty of states. Although a state may reach the motorist himself
because of his liability-creating act, it has never been considered that a personal
representative "steps into the shoes" of the decedent. The personal representative acquires no rights or duties from the decedent; all come from the
appointment by the domiciliary state. He is in the nature of a trustee, taking
nothing in his own right.21 Being separate from the deceased, he has no basic
relationship with the forum upon which the forum can base jurisdiction. Even
the police power of a state should not be able to create a basic relationship
where none in fact exists. If the concept of sovereignty has any meaning, it
must mean this much: A state has the power to limit the duties and rights
of its own legal creations, and no other state can impose liabilities upon that
creature when no connection between the latter state and the creature has
ever existed, unless the creating state consents to the impositions. These considerations would seem to outweigh the arguments that fairness and expediency
ought to permit an injured person to sue where the accident occurred.22 It is
submitted that the principal case reached an improper result.

Warren K. Urbom, S.Ed.

21 This is a relatively modern concept. In the older law the executor, if not the administrator, took full title to the property and could thus be sued anywhere. Holmes, ''Executors," 9 HARV. L. REv. 42 (1895); Judge Pound in McMaster v. Gould, note 8 supra.
22 This is not to suggest that it is undesirable to have the suit tried where the accident
occurs. But the result ought to be achieved through reciprocal statutes or similar devices
whereby the state of domicile consents to having the personal representatives appointed by
it sued elsewhere.

